Abstract-We prove that the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions are asymptotically convergent to their set of equilibria on any weighted undirected graph. We study various features of these dynamical systems, including the uniqueness and abundance properties of the set of equilibria and the emergence of unstable equilibria. We also introduce the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance on directed graphs, and demonstrate some of their interesting implications, including their correspondence to consensus and chromatic number of partite graphs. Examples illustrate our results.
study of these limiting behaviors. The dynamical systems resulting from the game-theoretic modeling of interactions on networks have a variety of applications in engineering systems, including distributed optimization [5] , resource allocation [6] , and analysis of competition between firms [7] .
This technical note is concerned with characterizing the limiting behavior of an important sub-class of such systems, namely the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions. These dynamics describe scenarios in which the payoff of each agent is positively enhanced by the investments of neighboring individuals and have recently been studied (see [8] ). Each agent aims at providing a unit of resource and invests only if this unit is not provided, collectively by itself and its neighboring agents. The rate of contributions of each agent is inversely proportional to the investments of others. In this sense, the model is a competitive threshold model [9] or exhibits strategic substitutability [10] . The recent survey [11] summarizes the importance of these models and their applications, including Cournot competition [8] and private provision of public goods and investment in security [12] , see also [13] , [14] . The recent work [15] studies the limiting behavior of piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems for some scenarios with asymmetric interactions.
A distinct aspect of the current work is that it is concerned with the limiting properties of this class in spite of the heterogenous character; in particular, unlike the results known in the literature, we study scenarios of sparse networks where strong dependencies on neighboring actions result in complex phenomena, including the abundance of equilibria and the emergence of unstable equilibria in stable submanifolds. These complex features are common with other similar cascades [7] . It is worth mentioning that the technical part of this work is related to the literature on stability analysis of piecewise linear systems [16] [17] [18] , notions of potential games [19] , cooperative and noncooperative dynamical systems [20] , [21] , and best-response dynamics [22] [23] [24] .
Our contributions in this technical note are threefold. First, we prove that the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions are asymptotically convergent when the network topology is undirected, thus extending the class of systems for which these dynamics are known to converge. Our proof relies on the asymptotic stability properties of continuous-time best-response dynamical systems for potential games with component-wise concave potential functions. Next, we demonstrate interesting features of the set of equilibria of these dynamical systems, including the uniqueness and abundance properties of the set of equilibria and the possibility of emergence of unstable equilibria in stable submanifolds. We discuss applications of these dynamical systems in stability analysis of OnOff Systems. We also introduce the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance, and show some of their interesting implications, including their connections to consensus. Several examples included in the technical note illustrate the results.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
We start with some notational conventions. Let R, C, R ≥0 , Z, and Z ≥1 denote the sets of real, complex, nonnegative real, integer, and 0018-9286 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
positive integer numbers, respectively. The set of eigenvalues of a matrix A ∈ R n×n , n ∈ Z ≥1 , is denoted by spec(A) ⊂ C. When A is symmetric, we denote by λ min (A) its minimum eigenvalue. We denote by φ : X ⇒ Y the set-valued mapping φ from the set X to the set Y .
A directed graph, or simply digraph, is a pair G = (V, E), where V is a finite set called the vertex set and E ⊆ V × V is the edge set. A weighted digraph is a triplet G = (V, E, A), where (V, E) is a digraph and A ∈ R n×n ≥0 is the adjacency matrix. We denote the entries of A by a ij , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with entry a ij > 0 if and only if (v i , v j ) ∈ E, and a ij = 0 otherwise. If a matrix A satisfies this property, we say that A is a weight assignment of the digraph G = (V, E). The outand in-degrees of v i ∈ V are, respectively, d
a ji . Unless mentioned otherwise, we further assume that a ij = 1 when (v i , v j ) ∈ E and that a ii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We also let N + i = {u ∈ V |(v i , u) ∈ E} and refer to it as the set of out-neighbors of v i .
In the technical note, we work primarily with the class of undirected graphs, or simply graphs, where the edge set E consists of unordered pairs of vertices. The degree of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted d (v) , is the number of neighbors of v. For a weighted graph, the weighted degree of
a ji . For an undirected graph, we simply refer to the the set N i as the set of neighbors of v i .
Finally, we recall some background on continuous-time dynamical systems following [25] . Consider a system on X ⊂ R d given by:
where t ∈ R ≥0 and Ψ :
A solution to this dynamical system is a continuously differentiable curve x : [0, T ] → X which satisfies (1) . The set of equilibria of (1) is denoted by Eq(Ψ) = {x ∈ X|Ψ(x) = 0}.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a weighted digraph G = (V, E, A) with n ∈ Z ≥1 vertices. Throughout the technical note, we study dynamical systems on G, where the evolution of the state of agent v i ∈ V iṡ
These dynamical systems have recently been introduced in [8] and correspond to the best-response dynamics, i.e., the myopic response of agents for maximizing their own costs, given the actions of their neighbors, for a class of strategic games, c.f. Section IV. We will frequently refer to (2) as the piecewise linear best-response dynamical systems of strategic interactions. Note that according to (2) , each agent aims at providing a unit of the resource and invests only if this unit is not provided, collectively by itself and its neighbors. The rate of contributions of each agent is inversely proportional to the investments of others. Many scenarios that arise in economics (e.g., Cournot competition [8] ) and engineering (e.g., private provision of public goods and investment in security [12] ) can be formulated as such dynamical systems. As in other switched systems, in general, studying the convergence of these dynamical systems is challenging. For the scenarios where the influence of the neighbors is not substantial, the convergence of (2) has been established in [8] . Let us recall this result after introducing some notations as well as terminology.
Definition 3.1-(Active and Passive Sets):
a ij x j > 0 and passive otherwise. We denote by S active , S passive :
where S active (x) ⊂ V and S passive (x) ⊂ V are the subsets of active and passive agents, respectively. Given a set of active agents V a ⊂ V , we call the set
n . Given V a ⊂ V , one can relabel the rows and the columns of the adjacency matrix A and partition it into active and
, where the subindices a and p correspond to active and passive, respectively. Clearly, when following the evolutions of (2), each agent can switch from being active to being passive, and vice versa. In particular, it is not hard to see that when the influence of neighbors is large, these switches can happen quite frequently. The following result characterizes an interesting class where (2) is asymptotically stable [8] . (2)): Suppose G is undirected. If λ min (I + A) > 0, then (2) has a unique equilibrium which is asymptotically stable.
Theorem 3.2-(Sufficient Conditions for Asymptotic Stability of
When the conditions of Theorem 3.2 are violated, as characterized in [8] , only a subset of the set of equilibria are stable. Hence, studying the stability properties of (2) for such scenarios becomes difficult, since these dynamical systems can become unstable on some active set X active (V a ), V a ⊂ V . Nevertheless, the trajectories may only visit these unstable regions for a finite time and still be convergent. In fact, when the underlying network is undirected, this is indeed the case and these dynamical systems are always convergent, regardless of the value of the weights on the adjacency matrix. We establish this result in the next section.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC CONVERGENCE OF MYOPIC STRATEGIC INTERACTION DYNAMICS
We start this section by the construction of a game whose bestresponse dynamics is the dynamical system (2). Before stating the main result of this section, we recall the definition of a potential game [19] . Consider a game G with players {v 1 , . . . , v n } with the strategy sets, respectively, X 1 , . . . , X n and payoff functions u 1 , . . . , u n , where
. . , n}. We denote by v −i the set of all players, except v i . Similarly, when v i chooses the strategy x i , we denote by x −i the strategy of all other players. The game G is called potential if there exists a function P : X 1 × · · · × X n → R such that for every player v i and for every strategy
i.e., improvements for any player increases the function P .
Consider now a game G ml , defined over an undirected graph G, with the set of players V , the strategy set of each player being [0,1], and the payoff of the ith player being u i : [0, 1] n → R, where
which this player aims to maximize. Given the strategies of its neighbors, the best-response strategy x * i ∈ [0, 1] of the ith player is then
and hence the dynamical system (2) is precisely the best-response dynamical system for G ml . Note that the construction of G ml is certainly not unique (see [8] for more examples). Our first result shows that choosing G ml as above has its advantages. 
Proposition 4.1-(G ml Is a Potential Game):
The game G ml , defined over an undirected graph, with payoff functions given by (3), is a potential game with the potential function P : [0, 1] n → R given by
The proof follows immediately from the definition of potential function above. One can also see that the game G ml with payoff functions (3) is strategically equivalent to a game where all players have the same (common) cost function (4) , that is a team; following the construction that was first introduced in [26] , simply add to (3) for i-th player x j 's for j = i so that the resulting (modified) u i 's are identical for all i (which would be P ). The construction of G ml has another useful property that allows us to conclude that (2) is indeed convergent.
Theorem 4.2-(Asymptotic Convergence to the Set of Equilibria):
The trajectories of (2) are globally asymptotically convergent to the set of equilibria of G ml .
Proof:
, we also have that x i (t) ≥ 0 t ∈ R ≥0 . As a result, the trajectories of (2) are bounded. Moreover, the potential function (4) is component-wise strictly concave. Thus, by invoking the result of [24, p. 347] , P serves as a Lyapunov function and the best-response dynamical system (2) is convergent. Fig. 1 demonstrates this result for a cycle network with ten agents. By providing an independent proof, we demonstrate in the next example that the result of Theorem 4.2 is highly nontrivial, even for small size networks.
Example 4.3-(Stability Outside the Sufficient Conditions of Theorem 3.2):
Consider the best-response dynamical system on the path graph with three nodes, given bẏ
where δ ∈ [0, 1]. We denote by A the adjacency matrix associated to this graph. Note that, by Theorem 4.2, (5) is convergent to its set of equilibria. Let us show this by a direct proof. Since λ min (I + δA) = 1 − √ 2δ, the result of Theorem 3.2 leads to asymptotic stability of (5) when 0 ≤ δ < (1/ √ 2). We next show that more is true and (5) is in fact asymptotically stable for also any (1/ √ 2) ≤ δ < 1. Toward that end, we first prove that the subspace
is invariant under the flow. Note that since x 1 + x 3 ≥ 1, agent 2 is passive and thus when x(0) ∈ W , for all t ∈ R >0 , x 2 (t) ≤ x 2 (0). Moreover, since x 2 ≤ (1/2δ) and in Ẇ
we conclude that
, for all t ∈ R >0 , thus proving our claim. Next, we show that any trajectory starting from any initial condition x ∈ W , will eventually enter W . Note that (5) has no equilibrium in the region U = {x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ [0, 1] 3 |x 1 + x 3 < (1/δ)}; moreover, I 3 + δA has one negative eigenvalue and thus any trajectory starting from an initial condition x(0) ∈ U will eventually leave this region, entering W . Also, since agent 2 is passive in [0, 1] 3 \ (U ∪ W ), any trajectory starting from this region will eventually leave this region, yielding the result. Next, since the flow is invariant in W , using a Lyapunov argument on this region, we conclude that any flow entering W will asymptotically converge.
• An interesting by-product of our treatment is a proof of stability for some challenging classes of piecewise dynamical systems, as we state in the following remark.
Remark 4.4-(Stability Analysis of a Class of On-Off Systems):
We introduce a class of decentralized On-Off Systems (OFSs), motivated by the single-input version studied in [17, Section VI] . Consider the control system
where x(t) ∈ R n , n ∈ Z ≥1 , C ∈ R n×n , and u(t) ∈ R n is defined via
. Additionally, assume that C is the adjacency matrix associated with an undirected connected graph G with n j=1 c ij = 1, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The control input is thus decentralized over G. Next, consider a potential game with n players, where the ith player's strategy set is 0 ≤ x i ≤ d i and this player is maximizing the function u i (
One can easily observe that the control system (6) corresponds to the best-response dynamical system for this game; furthermore, similar to the construction in Proposition 4.1, the corresponding potential function is indeed component-wise concave. Hence, (6) is asymptotically convergent to its set of equilibria. Note that proving this result directly appears to be nontrivial.
• Before concluding this section, we collect some interesting features of the set of equilibria of (2).
A. Unique Equilibrium in Directed Networks
We first provide a result which shows that a subclass of the dynamics (2) on directed graphs is convergent to a unique equilibrium. Note that since the graph is directed, Theorem 4.2 cannot be used to conclude convergence, as the potential game structure is lost. (2) is convergent to it.
Proof: Recall that the trajectories of (2) 
. , x n )
T and A is the corresponding weighted adjacency matrix. Any equilibrium of this linear system thus satisfies (A + I n )x = 1.
(7)
By Gersgorin disks Theorem [27, Theorem 6.1.1], and since G has no self-loops and
where the last inclusion holds by the assumption made. Thus A + I n is invertible and the solution to (7) is indeed unique. The asymptotic convergence of the best-response dynamics also follows immediately from the fact that the eigenvalues of this matrix all have positive real parts.
B. Abundance of Equilibria
We next show that the dynamical system (2) can have a continuum of equilibria. Consider an undirected path graph with n ∈ Z ≥1 vertices, where every edge is weighted by δ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that for any choice of δ, the matrix I + δA, where A is the adjacency matrix, has at most one zero eigenvalue. This is because the eigenvalues of A can be written in terms of Chebyshev polynomials [28] , which are orthogonal polynomials and thus have distinct eigenvalues. Let us now consider the case where n = 4. The set of eigenvalues of A is given by 4 |(I + δA)x = 1} is an equilibrium of (2).
C. Emergence of Unstable Equilibria in Stable Submanifolds
Consider a path graph with n = 4 and let δ = 0.9, which is larger than the threshold for which Theorem 3.2 applies. Using the Stable Manifold Theorem [29] , the stable submanifold S stable is of dimension 3. Let us take the initial condition to be x 0 = (0.3717, 0.6015, 0.6015, 0.3717) T ∈ S stable . Fig. 2(a) shows the trajectories of (2) starting from x 0 . These trajectories are asymptotically convergent to x * = (0.9174, 0.0917, 0.0917, 0.9174) T ∈ S stable . Nevertheless, with small perturbations in the initial conditions, orthogonal to S stable , the trajectories leave S stable ; see Fig. 2(b) . Fig. 2. (a) and (b) show the trajectories of (2) for a path graph with 4 agents with the initial conditions of x 0 and x 0 + 0.051 4 .
V. SOCIAL RELATION AND THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DYNAMICS
In previous sections, we have focused mainly on stability analysis of the dynamical system (2) for the case where the underlying graph is undirected. In this section, we further explore the asymptotic behaviors of those dynamical systems by considering the directed case. In the upcoming discussion, unless otherwise stated, we assume that the underlying graph G = (V, E) is a directed weighted graph. Let us define the two concepts of social dominance and social equivalence. 
Our second result is related to the implications of social dominance. We first show that if one agent is socially dominated by another agent, and at some point of time the dominated agent v i invests more (i.e., x i (t) ≥ x j (t)), then it should invest more than the other agent indefinitely. Subsequently, we show that if this does not happen, i.e., a socially dominated v i keeps working less than v j forever, then either the neighbors of v i are hard-working or the neighbors of v j (other than v i ) are asymptotically lazy, in the sense of the size of their contributions.
Proposition 5.3-(Implications of Social Dominance): Consider a digraph G = (V, E, A) and the associated dynamics (2), and suppose
all t ≥ T . b. Suppose that the weights on A are uniform over the edges, i.e., for any a i > 0, we have a i = δ for some δ > 0. If for all t ≥ 0, we have
Proof: Let us start with the proof of the first statement.
a. Since v i is socially dominated by v j , we havė
Note that f i and f j are continuous functions on [0, 1] n . Also, since v i is socially dominated by v j , for any point in x ∈ [0, 1] n , we have that f i (x) ≥ f j (x). Thus, if for some time instance T ≥ 0, we have x i (T ) ≥ x j (T ), then by the comparison principle (see [25, Lemma 3.4] ), it follows that x i (t) ≥ x j (t) for all t ≥ T . b. We next prove the second statement. By (8), we havė
Thus, by integrating both sides of the above equation
x (s), 0) and the inequality follows from the fact that The above results shed more lights on the asymptotic behavior of the dynamics (2) . As an example of such implications, let G = (V, E) be a complete q-partite graph, i.e., an undirected graph G = (V, E) with V being disjoint union of q non-empty sets V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V q (which are commonly referred to as components) with E = 1 = 2 V 1 × V 2 . Note that any two vertices belonging to the same component have the same set of neighbors. Therefore, by Proposition 5.2, we have lim t→∞ x i (t) = lim t→∞ x j (t) for any i, j ∈ V for some ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As a result, if the sizes of the components are different, one may expect that for a random initial condition the asymptotic value of the dynamics (2) have q distinct values. Note that q is the chromatic number of a complete q-partite graph. We conjecture that this holds true for a random graph G, i.e., the distinct values of the asymptotic value of dynamics (2) started at a random initial condition is approximately equal to the chromatic number of G.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that the dynamical systems of piecewise linear strategic interaction dynamics on networks are convergent on any undirected graph topology. Our proof relies on casting such dynamical systems as the best-response dynamics of a class of potential games with component-wise concave potential functions. We have also introduced the novel notions of social equivalence and social dominance and have characterized and studied their implications on the asymptotic behavior of dynamical systems. Many avenues of future work appear to be open, including the study of asymmetric interactions (directed case), the design of other classes of strategic games which are not completely myopic, further investigation on the casting of the strategic interaction dynamics as a distributed strategy for approximating the chromatic number, and studying scenarios with time-varying networks and their applications to stability analysis of switched dynamical systems.
